A 112 Cautionary Tale

On August 5, 2024, the volatility index, VIX, spiked to 65, the fastest spike in Implied Volatility ever recorded. Anyone with significant holdings in naked options, including the 112, likely took significant losses.

The August 5, 2024 VIX Explosion Impact

In August 5, 2024 pre-market trading, the volatility index, VIX, spiked to 65, although the market was only down a moderate amount. The market had the fastest spike in Implied Volatility ever recorded, and anyone with significant holdings in naked options, and especially the 112, likely took significant, if not catastrophic losses.

Stock traders shrugged, but option traders, especially short in futures options, saw premiums explode to extreme levels. Short traders saw margin requirements explode and marked positions move to 10, 20, or even 30 times the initial amount collected in losses they couldn’t escape in illiquid markets.

The 112 trade, which is written about on this site in several places, was the poster child for big losses. Often traders use futures options that are leveraged to the max using SPAN margin. The trade promises to have a buffer of a 1-1 debit spread to provide a barrier from big losses in downturns. The 2 other short strikes are set to be so far out of the money that they should almost never get in the money for big losses. But this time it didn’t work- a fairly small downturn created huge losses and extreme increases in margin requirements.

Many seasoned traders I know saw their accounts reduced by 30-50% overnight with their brokers liquidating positions to satisfy margin requirements. In short, the debit side of this trade didn’t provide the promised protection during this event. Many traders, including me, saw big losses even though the debit spread didn’t even go in the money and the short puts were still well out of the money. It was the implied volatility that did the positions in, not the actual underlying market indexes.

Personal Impact

My experiences were mixed during this episode, but in all cases very eye-opening. I’ve done a lot of modelling of option pricing based on historical moves, the speed of moves, and other factors, and felt like I had a pretty good understanding of how volatility changes, even in big market moves. I survived the Covid crash, for goodness sake.

In most of my accounts, I had sufficient cash or cash equivalents to prevent a major problem with my account. However, I had one account that had two contracts of 112 positions that were using 90% of the account’s buying power before the big August 5 event (a bad idea in so many ways), and that account suffered a huge loss and was liquidated by my broker. I suffered a 250% loss, going from +$11,000 to -$17,000 overnight, which isn’t a small loss for anyone. My broker sold all of my short positions at the very bottom, in the early morning hours before the market even opened, locking in the losses, and then left the long spread positions to decrease in value as the market recovered, not allowing me to trade anything, due to having negative buying power in the account. It was a very helpless feeling to watch and see that much money evaporate. And then I got the email asking me to add money to get the account out of the hole. I asked why they had waited so long to close the positions, and why they didn’t wait any longer, but it isn’t the broker’s fault for this. It’s my problem and I have to own it. I simply got complacent and didn’t follow any of my own rules for capital allocation. I was greedy and I got burned- bad.

I wasn’t the only one, and in the aftermath, I read several option trader’s notes (that actually sell their trading advice) that lost years of profit during this event.

For all my other accounts that survived, the swings in value in accounts that had short options trading with margin was troubling and surprising. The fact that the values recovered as fast as they declined doesn’t change the fact that this could have been much worse and there are many lessons to learn.

For most stock investors, or even traders that sell option spreads or covered options, this event was no big deal. It was a problem for mainly for traders who sold naked options on margin, and especially for those that sold naked futures options on SPAN margin.

So, what actually happened, and why were so many option traders caught unprepared? Let’s dig into what happened, and then discuss how to avoid this kind of negative impact in the future.

The Perfect Storm of Fear

Markets were cruising to new highs in mid-July when it seemed that the market realized that maybe it was the time of year to finally step back and the market came down a bit. It was no big deal until August when the July jobs report came out on Friday August 2, showing very weak jobs data and an unexpected increase in unemployment. The market fell 1.8% during the day and there was a sense that the nation’s economy might be in trouble. Then over the weekend, foreign markets reacted, primarily in Japan, where the yen surged in value compared to the dollar, and many “safe” currency trades quickly unraveled. The Japenese stock market plunged over 12% in early trading, and the rest of the world followed along as other markets opened for Monday trading. With US Futures trading open, prices of all the indexes started down. Everyone trading wanted to get out, but there was no one available to bail them out. Futures options were the worst, with enormous bid-ask spreads with no one willing to make the market flow in orderly fashion. It was still the middle of the night.

Option traders awoke to alerts and margin calls from brokers. With an hour to go before the markets opened, buyers stepped in and started grabbing the bargain prices that were available, and selling short options for the astronomical prices that contracts were marked at, as brokers liquidated the unfortunate accounts of those who hadn’t cleared their negative balances. For those with cash, it was the opportunity of a lifetime. For those in trouble, some lost life savings over night. The best and worst of times.

When the market opened, it was down 3% from Friday’s close, but up from the worst levels of the night. It recovered about a percent in the morning but closed near where it opened. However, there was a sense that the worst had come and gone. Option prices quickly came back into somewhat normal ranges, and margin requirements relaxed. As the week progressed the market slowly eased up, day by day. By the end of the week, the market was essentially unchanged from the end of the previous week. Did anything really happen, or was it a dream? For almost everyone invested in the market, this situation was a non-event, a slight downturn, a bit of noise. But for Futures options traders that had naked positions, this was a never-to-forget nightmare.

By mid-August, it appeared that all the worries were for nothing. The US market moved back to near the record high levels set in July. Happy days were here again. But this isn’t normal.

Unprecedented Changes in Implied Volatility

In the past, increases in Implied Volatility have taken much bigger declines in the market for this big of a change. For example, during Covid, the market was down over 30% and the VIX volatility index hit 80 at the bottom after several weeks of large daily declines. The whole world’s economy came to a grinding halt and the market slid with it. At the time it was one of the most terrifying situations the world had seen.

In contrast, at the market’s lowest point on the morning of Monday, August 5, the S&P 500 futures were trading about 10% below the peak they hit in mid-July, and VIX sky-rocketed to 65. It was at less than 30 the Friday before. This rapid expansion in Implied Volatility over such a small timeframe and relatively small index price drop was unprecedented. Option prices multiplied in value and SPAN margin requirements for futures options increased exponentially. Brokers reached out in the middle of the night asking customers to add capital to their accounts, but from where, and how? Since the markets were closed, only minimal amounts of trading was going on and markets froze up with orders becoming unfillable. Trapped traders couldn’t get out, assuming they were even awake and aware of what was going on.

Likewise, the decrease in the VIX volatility index over the next few weeks was also remarkable. By August 16, the VIX index was below 15. Historically, large increases in volatility take months or even years to return to low levels, so this spike from levels of around 12 in early July to over 60 a month later, then back to 15 in less than two weeks is different than anything ever seen before.

For those not familiar, the VIX index is calculated by the CBOE to measure the volatility implied by options on the SPX index with expirations around 30 days away. The VIX index is not tradeable directly, but there are tradeable options, as well as futures that can be bought and sold. VIX is often considered the market’s “fear gauge,” but technically it is an evaluation of how richly options are priced. Since options are priced based on known values, with the only unknown value being volatility, this measure of “implied” volatility impacts all option prices. The numerical value of Implied Volatility of any option is a measure of how much the market expects the underlying security or index to move over the next year, but pro-rated down to the amount for the time left until option expiration.

Margin impacts

Margin works in a lot of ways with options. See the article on margin to learn more. But margin as true leverage is most apparent when selling naked options. For naked short options on stock, ETFs, or Indexes, most margin requirements are based roughly on having 20% of the notional value of the underlying in the account to cover a big move. So, one option contract on a stock trading at $100 would have a notional value of $10,000 and a seller of a naked option would be required to have $2000 for every contract, or would use $2000 of buying power or capital for each contract. If the stock moved 5%, the margin would likely require another 5% of the notional value, which could be as much or more than the premium collected.

If a trader is selling naked options on futures, a different margin calculation comes into play, SPAN margin. SPAN margin is a complex formula, but basically looks at the futures options positions and calculates a worst-case one day move, based on the IV of each option and other factors. This is typically a much lower requirement than what is required for options on stocks and ETFs, so a trader can have a lot more leverage. However, this works both ways. When the market moves, additional margin can be required based on the amount of the move, plus the amount that the “worst case” increased to. On August 5, when VIX spiked to over 60, the worst case scenarios as calculated by the SPAN margin calculation exploded by huge amounts, in addition to losses in holdings that were highly leveraged. As VIX virtually tripled, buying power requirements for futures options also went up by triple or more, when accounting for losses on top of the increased SPAN margin requirements.

Many traders in turn faced margin calls from brokers, asking them to get buying power from negative values to positive. For some the only way to do this was to buy back badly losing positions at big losses at terrible prices with terrible spreads. As much as anything, margin requirements drove liquidation as much as price movement.

The lesson on margin with options from this event is to always have cash or cash equivalent positions that can be easily liquidated to have cash to cover all margin requirements. Even a trader with the worst naked option exposure positions would be alright if their account was 80-90% cash. For me, I had accounts that I had to sell short term bond ETFs to cover buying power requirements on August 5. Every account but one was fine.

Within a few hours of the worst of August 5, VIX dropped significantly, and SPAN margin requirements reduced as well. The question was a matter of whether each trader had enough capital to weather the storm.

Marked loss impacts

When implied volatility spikes, Vega raises the price of options. On a percentage basis, the impact is greater for strikes further out of the money. For the 112 trade, the “1-1” portion of the trade that includes a 50 point wide debit spread has both strikes increase in price, fairly close to the same amount, while the two far out of the money strikes also rise substantially, but with nothing to cancel out their rise. The overall impact is that the total premium can grow much more than even the percentage increase in Implied Volatility. This is especially true if the positions were opened during a period of very low IV.

So, for a trader that opened a 112 trade when IV was down around 12-13 VIX, the explosion to a VIX of over 60 made the position’s premium value explode to 10-20 times what was collected, something that most traders would never have expected.

Position size considerations and notional value

With the 112 trade on /ES futures, a trader can use as little as $5000 buying power to control $500,000 of notional value. Even at very low Delta values for the 2 short strikes, it doesn’t take a very big move down to lose way more than the initial buying power. As we’ve just discussed, a big move causes two immediate problems for the trader, a marked loss as premium explodes, and an explosion of buying power requirements.

What is the solution? Keep trades like these a small portion of an account. The vast majority of the time, these trades just decay, leaving the seller with great profits, but when that rare occasion occurs, there needs to be plenty of capital in an account to cover losses and have the ability to manage the position.

Impact of the number of net naked options

I’ve tended to trade mostly covered positions and spreads, where this kind of scenario can’t happen because risk is defined, and a position can’t lose more than the buying power it requires. But it is easy to be persuaded by the siren call of those that tell traders to put on their big boy pants and sell naked options. Somehow, this is considered by some to be the mark of a mature option trader.

Often, traders are told that the buying power required is a good indicator of the risk of a trade. I’ve seen dozens of studies that make this claim. But typically, if you look at the fine print, these studies will say something like naked trades don’t lose more than their buying power 99.5% of the time, or some other high percentage. The problem is that the percentage is not 100%, and that little percent will surface on rare occasions, usually when least expected, immediately after a period of very calm markets.

The key isn’t to completely avoid naked trades, it is to manage the number of naked contracts being traded. During the August 5 event, 112 traders were much more impacted than 111 traders. The difference was two naked puts instead of one. Does that mean traders can load up on 111 and be fine? No, it just means that comparing two trades that both use naked options needs to account for the number of contracts that are naked and the difference in notional value and tail risk. Maybe the 112 trade has a slightly better return on capital typically than the 111. Is the additional risk worth it?

And it isn’t just the naked portion of multi-leg trades that need to be considered. Individual naked trades, as well as strangles or straddles sold naked can be even more susceptible to tail risk. There is a line of reasoning that diversifying will greatly reduce these risks, but in periods of uncertainty and big moves, prices fall across the board and implied volatility spikes everywhere.

Keeping the number of naked positions under control in an account may be the way to prevent a blow-up the next time the market melts down.

Defined risk vs. Naked Risk

If we compare risk of different types of option trading strategies, we can see that there is no risk-free way to trade options, and each risk level has a different set of risk parameters. Probably the closest comparison to selling naked options is to sell credit spreads.

Often, traders confuse the defined risk of credit spreads with being low-risk. In a credit spread, there is the very real risk of losing 100% of the buying power that was required or “defined” by the trade. However, during the August 5 event, the move didn’t impact most traders with out of the money put spreads, because both the long and short strikes of the trade went up significantly in value and if still out of the money, the net premium only went up a portion of the buying power as the moves mostly cancelled each other. Only when prices take an entire spread into the money are worst case scenarios in play. During the Covid crash where the market went down over 30%, this was the case for most spread traders. But on August 5, probably not.

Naked trades on the other hand have no hedge of a long option to provide any protection when the going gets tough. Naked traders are susceptible to both premium increase and buying power requirement increases at the same time when implied volatility spikes, even if the underlying price doesn’t move that far. This is the lesson for naked traders from August 5.

When the tide goes out, you find out who is swimming naked.

Warren Buffet has many famous quotes, and this is one of them. On August 5, 2024, if you were swimming naked with futures options in particular, or even naked options on margin in general, you were probably exposed. I’m not sure that this is exactly what Mr. Buffet meant by this saying, but in this case, a literal interpretation is very fitting.

One time event, or regular occurrence?

What happened on August 5, 2024 was a very unique set of circumstances that came together to create an unprecedented spike of implied volatility. Never before has VIX shot above 60 so quickly, and never before has VIX receded so quickly. So, is this rare event a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence, or will we see similar events on a regular basis?

I’m afraid that we are going to see this type of event many more times. We’ve seen global financial squeezes happen in the past, and this wasn’t even that crazy of a situation. The final straw that broke the proverbial camel’s back with this event was a liquidity crisis in Japan over a weekend. We’ve had other big banking fiascos around the world before and this one may not even be in the top 10 ugliest. What is different is the sheer amount of option positions that are in place now compared to only a few years ago. Today, it is normal for option volume to exceed the number of actual shares traded on major exchanges.

Why does the amount of option volume matter? While shareholders of stocks can simply hold through most downturns, option traders are often leveraged in fairly short duration positions that carry significant risk. When markets change, more traders need to purchase protection or need to get out of losing trades to stop their losses. If this happens when markets are closed, there isn’t much liquidity, and few sellers, so option prices go up, driving up implied volatility. With lots of people wanting to buy to get out or buy to protect, the lack of sellers can cause a panic. This is what we saw on the morning of August 5. Nothing has fundamentally changed since then, and option traders are continuing to grow in numbers.

My fear is that it will take less and less significant events to drive implied volatility and option prices to extreme levels going forward. So, if you weren’t impacted by VIX spike of August 5, consider this a warning shot across the bow. For some of us, they sunk our battleship. Don’t let it happen again.

The 1-1-2-2 Put Ratio Trade

Like all the front ratio type trades I have shared, this trade is a defined risk version of a very similar front ratio trade featuring naked short puts. My versions hedge the trade with long puts to limit the risk. However, in this trade, I will also discuss the unlimited risk version of the trade, the 1-1-2, because the additional risk isn’t that much from a practical standpoint.

I’m a big fan of front ratio type trades. I’ve written about my success with Broken Wing Butterflies and Broken Wing Put Condors. Another trade that fits in the group is the 1-1-2-2 Put Ratio. I don’t know of a named reference to a bird or insect for this trade, so I’m going with 1-1-2-2. Like all the front ratio type trades I have shared, this trade is a defined risk version of a very similar front ratio trade featuring naked short puts. My versions hedge the trade with long puts to limit the risk. However, in this trade, I will also discuss the unlimited risk version of the trade, the 1-1-2, because the additional risk isn’t that much from a practical standpoint.

I picked up the concept of this trade from one of my favorite traders, “Sweet Bobby” Gaines, who I have mentioned previously in at least one other page on this site. Bobby is a big proponent of the 1-1-2 trade, and has posted numerous videos on it on his YouTube channel, including his recent rising star appearance on Tasty Trade. But really, the trade is the next level of evolution moving from broken wing butterfly to broken wing condor to “one louder” as they say in the mythical group Spinal Tap.

What all these trades have in common is selling an out of the money debit put spread, and financing by selling further out of the money puts or wider credit put spreads. The combination delivers a net credit, but also sets up an interesting dynamic of extra rapid decay of the premium involved. The farther out puts or put spreads decay faster than the closer debit spread, and often lead to the debit spread having more value than the credit spread. These trades take in a credit to open, and often can take in a credit to close. At least that’s how I set them up and manage them.

All these trades are a variation of a front ratio spread, where more options are sold than bought with hedges added to define risk. I’ve also written about back ratio spreads where more options are bought than sold. Front ratios are designed for maximizing decay, while back ratios set up multiple long positions paid for by a costly short position.

The previously discussed broken wing condor could also be called a 1-1-1-1 trade. In that trade we buy a put spread and then sell another put spread further out for more money, collecting a net credit. Four different strikes, 1 contract each. So what is a 1-1-2-2?

1-1-2-2 Basic trade setup

The 1-1-2-2 takes this a step farther, because we use two credit spreads very far out of the money to pay for the debit spread. The 1-1 part is buying a put around 25 delta and selling a put around 20 delta. The 2-2 part is selling two puts at around 5 delta and buying two puts around 1 delta. The goal is for the 2-2 to sell for about twice what the 1-1 cost. I like to set these up with 45-55 days remaining to expiration, quite a bit longer than the other ratio trades I’ve discussed.

What is the advantage of this? Well, because each of the two short strikes are further out, we greatly improve the odds of being profitable, and increase the initial rate of decay of the total position. We end up with a big gap between the debit spread strikes and the two short put strikes. Lots of good things happen with this setup. The biggest upside is that there is no upside risk- if price goes up, the trade makes money. The downside of this trade is that it can consume a lot of capital and has significant tail risk, which we will get into before we are done. Let’s look at a typical example.

Pricing and Greeks for the 1-1-2-2 position
In this example, each of the two low delta puts collect about what the debit spread costs (~$10).

The first thing I want to point out in this example is that the 3100 short put is 900 points below the current price of $4000. For that strike to get in the money, it would take a 22.5% decline in the market in 55 days. That won’t happen very often. To be fair, this example uses values with VIX at 25, a historically higher than average value, but for the timeframe of 2020-2022, a fairly middle of the road level. The higher that implied volatility is, the farther away the short strikes can be and still collect meaningful premium.

The next thing to point out in the setup numbers is the Greeks. Delta is fairly flat at +3. For a credit trade, that isn’t much and means that the position can handle some movement in price. Theta is $69/day, and we collected $805. So, the position is expected to lose 1/12 of its value each day. But we have 55 days, so how does that work? Quite well, I’d say.

Finally, we can’t ignore the capital risk of $115,000. How can this be? If the price drops below $2500 at expiration, a 47.5% drop, the loss would be $115,000. While extremely unlikely (we didn’t lose that much in the Covid crash of 2020), it is possible in some disastrous scenarios. We’ll discuss this later as it impacts capital requirements and how one perceives risk. At the end of this post, I’ll explain how we can get into this trade for a fraction of this buying power.

Numbers are one thing. A picture or three might help make this all more clear.

overall profit profile chart
The dotted lines represent expected moves. This trade is profitable at expiration if the market doesn’t go down more than two expected moves.

This chart shows how changes in the underlying price will impact the profit and loss of the trade. We evaluate at four points in time. The green diamond shows our initial position at 55 DTE, underlying price is $4000, and the P/L is zero. The curvy lavender line shows how price would likely impact the position with 35 DTE. The green curve shows the likely profit at 14 DTE, and the sharp purple lines are the expiration values. We know exactly what expiration values will be at any price, but the curves are estimates based on likely impact to implied volatility as time passes and prices change.

I’ve put in dotted lines to show the expected move and multiple expected moves down. If you need a refresher, check my earlier post on expected moves. It is likely that price will end up inside of one expected move, the dotted lines on either side of the current price of $4000. There is approximately a 2% chance that price will move two expected moves to the second dotted line below the current price, which would still be max profit for this trade at expiration. And there is approximately a 0.3% chance of moving three expected moves to the far left dotted line. We can go further, but the odds keep dropping as we go to lower levels. However, as history has shown, moves down tend to have somewhat higher probability than theoretic probabilities once we get beyond two expected moves. The bottom long puts are a final defense to limit losses for going even more extreme in a rapid crash. The point is that this trade is very likely to end up profitable, but there is risk that an extremely big move down could lead to an extremely big loss. We’ll talk about ways to reduce exposure later.

Now that we’ve talked a bit about the very unlikely outcomes, let’s zoom in and discuss the most likely scenarios. Here’s the profit chart showing prices down to 25% below the current price with profit and loss zones highlighted.

This chart shows the profit and loss compared to most likely underlying price levels.

Zooming in allows us to see the profit levels in the timeframes referenced above. Notice that down moves initially can drive the position to a loss, but if the move doesn’t go below the two short puts at 3100, the position will be highly profitable at expiration. In fact, this trade does best in the very wide range of a price drop between 6 and 22 percent, bringing in up to $5000 additional credit.

If price goes up or drops less than 200 points, we can keep our initial premium at expiration. We may be able to collect more. The profit curve at 14 DTE is actually above the expiration profit if the price remains the same. How is this possible? Because the 1-1 debit put spread decays slower than the 2-2 credit spread, eventually the 1-1 part is worth more than the 2-2 part, even though the 2-2 part started out worth twice as much as the 1-1.

Let’s look at this another way. Prices don’t generally move immediately to a new level, but have probabilities of moves that get bigger over time. Again, going back to expected moves, let’s compare how we might expect price to move during the duration of the trade.

Price expected moves
This chart shows expected moves day by day from initiating the trade until expiration, and compares to the put strike prices.

In this chart I’ve shown several outcomes. The zero move is if price doesn’t change at all, a baseline. I’ve shown a +1% move which is in line with the positive drift of the market. There’s also a line for the positive expected move and the negative expected move, where price is likely to be within at any point in time. And finally I’ve shown a curve for a price move of two times the expected move down. Notice where the strikes are relative to the price curves are. The negative curves take time to get below the upper 1-1 put strikes, and never reach even the short put of the 2-2 credit spread.

Now let’s look at what happens to the value of our premium if price were to follow each of these curves. This is a view that you don’t see much because it is based on lots of assumptions for the pricing models. Since implied volatility is not predictable in the future, the chart makes assumptions for how price and time will most likely impact volatility and premium value.

option premium vs time
This chart shows how different underlying price trends would likely impact option premium over time.

Initially, this position collected $8.05 in premium, so we start with a negative or short value of -8.05. From there the price moves shown in the previous chart drive the premium up or down along with time decay. If price is flat or going up, premium decays and moves quickly toward zero premium. If the price goes down, the positive Delta pushes premium to more negative values. The price move of negative two expected moves really does a number on our premium initially, driving it down to below -30.

But, remember our profit chart at expiration? The flat and positive moves end up with a profit of our initial premium (all the puts have zero value at expiration, and the negative expected move and negative double expected move end up at maximum profit. Since our debit spread is 50 points wide, the negative moves would leave it fully in the money for a premium value of +50 points. And that’s in addition to the initial premium collected to open the trade. The challenge is that to get that max profit, we likely will have points in time where our position loses money.

The probability of getting to max profit is low because it would require a price drop between 6 and 22%. Based on our put strike Deltas we can estimate that we have about a 20% chance of that. Most of the other 80% is expiring with all strikes out of the money. So, it might be wise to zoom in and understand what happens with the vast majority of trades.

1-1-2-2 value vs. time chart
In most situations, the premium of the 1-1-2-2 front ration decays quickly, maxes out, and then levels off before losing value.

I used this chart as the featured image of this post because I thought it best illustrates how this trade plays out most of the time. If you remember when we discussed the Greeks, I pointed out that Theta is very high compared to the premium. From this chart we see that if price stays the same or is slightly up, premium will decay to zero by 35 DTE, or just 20 days into the trade. This is an example that Theta isn’t 100% accurate by itself as it looked like 12 days of Theta should move us to zero value. It could be that IV modeling is slightly off or the Theta was off, but still we have very rapid decay that I don’t think anyone can complain about.

Like all ratio style trades we have discussed, this trade has the possibility of switching from negative to positive premium. The difference with this trade is that it is actually quite likely, and as such we need to plan for it and manage our profit accordingly.

I’ve colored in the area under our three flat-to-positive curves with three zones each. There is a green zone where positive premium is growing, a yellow zone where premium is topping out, and a red zone where positive premium is being lost. Notice that the curve of the 1% up move and no price move are fairly close together, and that’s because the price movement is relatively close to the same compared to the other moves we are analyzing.

Let’s review how this happens. This trade essentially has two spreads, a slow decaying debit spread (1-1), and a fast decaying credit spread (2-2). The credit spread decays faster because it is farther out from the money, is much wider, and has twice the value to start with. All these factors help decay happen more quickly. As long as the price stays fairly stable, this relationship will hold. Theta will be the primary driver of the premium value, and the wide credit spread will get to be worth less than the narrow debit spread.

The most likely scenario is that we stay inside the expected move and travel somewhere close to the no price move or 1% up move. Let’s realize that the market doesn’t move in equal amounts every day like this chart, so think of it as a smoothed out version of what premium would do. In the real world, premium would bounce up and down with price. However, if our price is close to where we started with 20 days until expiration, we would expect that the premium switch to positive has about maxed out, and it is probably a good time to close out the trade. Hopefully,your trading platform has a analysis feature that lets you look at your position and see how profits are changing day by day to help determine when the position is as high as it can go.

Without a chart, another way to determine how close the trade is to switching direction is to watch the position Theta. At the beginning of this trade, Theta was 0.688, or $68.80 for the full contract per day. As the trade progresses, Theta will decrease and at some point when the premium goes positive, Theta will turn from positive to negative. As it gets close to zero, that is the peak premium value. I generally try to exit the trade a few days before Theta is projected to turn negative. A big up day for the market could quickly change my very positive premium to not as positive premium, so it isn’t a time to get greedy.

So that brings us to the curve for the positive expected move. This is the curve that assumes that the price follows the one standard deviation move up. The good news when this happens is that premium decays very quickly because Delta and Theta team up. The not so good news is because the price move gets so far away from the strikes, the total position won’t get to a very high positive value. This is because all the options will drop in value quickly, approaching zero, and the upper debit spread won’t have much value. A big move up means that the probability of any of the strikes going into the money will be very low, so there is very little premium. As a result, it is likely we won’t be able to get out for much positive premium if any at all, but we will be able to keep most, if not all the premium from the opening trade. This is the least stressful outcome of the trade. If the price moves up faster than the expected move, premium will likely drop to very close to zero and may not ever go positive. So, if price is up a lot and the trade can be closed for a credit, I take the money and run. I’m happy to have a quick, winning trade.

The risky outcomes

Looking at the position vs time value chart, there are two lines that represent what happens if price goes down. One is the move down one expected move and the other is down two expected moves. Interestingly, in this example, both end up at max profit by the end of the trade. So, it would appear that the trade can’t lose, which is far from true. Notice that these premium values may go very negative if prices drop quickly after opening the trade. This is because the narrow debit spread doesn’t pick up as much value from increasing delta as the wide credit spread does in a down move. We know that if price stays above our credit spread short strike at expiration, we will make money, but when price moves quickly down, it isn’t clear that price will level off.

So, as a trader, we are left with a choice when the market drops, We can take a loss and get out of the trade, or wait to see if the market quits dropping before it tests or violates the credit spread strikes. If we are a week or two into the trade, a decent down move will not make a huge impact, but initially the trade can take a big hit from a down move. The longer we are into the trade without a big down move in price, the less the risk is of a loss. On the flip side, a big move down opens the possibility of additional big down moves that can lead to a very big loss. We reviewed the odds earlier- about 4% of the time the trade will lose based on the far short puts having an initial Delta of 4. If this trade is done enough times, there will be some losses. Let’s look at some management actions that could be taken.

1. Set a stop based on premium price. In this example, we collected just over $8 premium to open the trade. So, we could set a stop to avoid losing twice ($16) or maybe even three times ($24) our initial premium. This would mean a stop loss if premium climbs to $24 or $32, given that $8 premium is our starting break-even point. This is the simplest risk mitigation strategy. Using this will lower the overall win rate as many negative scenarios would end up fine if not closed, but this management technique will prevent huge losses that might impact the account dramatically.

2. Close the trade if the underlying price goes below a trigger point. We know this trade has a lot of cushion. We can handle much more than one expected move and be profitable. But if the move is much more than expected, we have to consider that the move is very unusual and dangerous for us. Perhaps our point to get out is when the debit spread is in the money, or when we are half-way between the debit spread and credit spread. Or maybe it is the short strike of the credit spread that is the final trigger to get out. The further down we allow price to go down, the more we stand to lose. Pick the underlying price where it gets too uncomfortable and use that as the trigger point to get out of the trade.

3. Roll out in time if premium or price triggers are hit. If the position is rolled before the credit spread is in the money, it can be rolled out for a credit. This gives more time for the market to turn around. However, it gives more time for a losing trader to lose more, because we likely can’t roll down that far and still get a credit, and we will likely have to pay to roll the debit spread or narrow the distance between spreads, making the trade less attractive. If the price move continues down, there will be much less room to maneuver going forward.

4. Simply hold on and hope the probabilities play out. With 55 days in the trade, we just need to move down less that two expected moves by expiration. If the capital is available, and the conviction is there, holding can bring max profit with a big down move. Note that as time passes and the credit spread stays out of the money, the premium has to go away, so the value can evaporate very quickly with very high Theta as expiration approaches. This can be observed in the value vs time graph for the -2 EM curve. It can also result in max loss. As expiration approaches, the difference between max profit and max loss is just a few percentage points of price movement and max loss is much more than max profit.

In this example we can see that a move down of one expected move really doesn’t challenge our position, while two times the expected move is playing with fire. So, one approach might be to hold as long as the move stays within the expected move to the downside and switch to closing or rolling once the move exceeds that or some other multiple of expected moves. In any case, a trader has to know their risk tolerance and have a management plan for both winning and losing trades.

What about calls?

A logical question might be- if this works so great for puts, why not double up and do it for calls as well? Well, there’s one problem- skew. On indexes implied volatility is higher as strikes go to lower values and declines for higher strike prices. As a result, out of the money puts have higher implied volatility than out of the money calls. More importantly, far out of the money puts have higher implied volatility than puts closer to the money.

Look at our setup for this example. Implied volatility of the single long put is around 25, while the two short puts have implied volatility of 39. This helps two ways. The short puts have more of their premium tied to volatility, bumping up their price compared to the long put. Also, the higher implied volatility pushes the strike price further down to get a matching premium to the debit spread, making the trade a higher probability of success. We are selling more of the higher implied volatility and buying lower implied volatility, a key reason to use front ratio spreads.

A similar setup for a 1-1-2-2 call trade would reverse the dynamics. The long call closest to the money would have the highest implied volatility and the two short calls would have the lowest. To collect similar amounts to the put trade, the call strikes would be much closer between the debit spread and credit spread, and the difference in the deltas of the strikes would also be closer together, meaning a narrower window of max profit, and a higher probability of max loss. While still a trade with positive probability, it generally isn’t as attractive as the put side.

1-1-2 vs 1-1-2-2

I haven’t talked much about the two long puts bought at less than one Delta to open the trade. They are very unlikely to ever be in the money, and most traders would opt to close or adjust the trade well before they came into play. So, why have them? The simple answer is that they define or limit the risk of the trade, potentially reducing the capital required for the trade, and protecting from absolute disaster in the event of a market crash of over 37.5% in under 55 days. It could happen, like it did in February and March of 2020 during the Covid pandemic. We are giving up 20% of our premium to protect for a once or twice in a lifetime super crash.

So, what if we eliminate the long puts and do a naked 1-1-2 ratio spread? Is it different in outcome or probabilities? The answer is that it is very similar in most ways, and we will also see that a lot depends on the type of account you are trading in as to what choices there are. First, let’s start with the setup of the 1-1-2 trade.

The 1-1-2 setup is similar to the 1-1-2-2
The 1-1-2 trade has two naked puts sold short, but way out of the money.

While this table shows the risk as unlimited, it is actually $618,855, the value of two 3100 puts if SPX went to zero by expiration ($620,000) less the $1,145 collected to start the trade.

Some accounts and some brokers require all trades to be defined in their risk. For example, retirement accounts generally aren’t allowed to use option margin and so any naked put would have to be cash secured. For this trade, eliminating the two long puts would mean the max loss would go up to $618,855, assuming that SPX went to zero, while we are holding two short 3100 puts. SPX will only go to zero if we see modern society end, and in that case, we’ll probably have bigger problems than our option positions. But rules are rules, and so if you want to trade without the long puts in a retirement account, you would need $620,000 capital to make a likely $800-$1200 or less than 0.2% return in 55 days or less. We’ll discuss other alternatives after we review the details of the 1-1-2 trade.

The profit profile for 1-1-2 is similar to 1-1-2-2
The profit profile for the 1-1-2 is very similar to the 1-1-2-2 other than the virtually unlimited loss.

Remember that our starting underlying price is $4000 and the trade is profitable at expiration as long as price is above 3100. The chart above doesn’t show losses all the way down to zero price, but just imagine zero price and -$618,855. Our probability of profit is 96% if held to expiration based on the Delta of 4 for the naked puts.

value vs time for 1-1-2
Most scenarios show a profit with 1-1-2

Looking at 1-1-2 values over time at the same price moves that we looked at for the 1-1-2-2 trade, we can see that the premium changes are fairly similar. Staying within one expected move keeps the trade moving in the direction of decay.

zoom in on 1-1-2 value over time
Zooming in on most likely outcome’s value over time

If we zoom in on the likely outcome, we see that premium behaves very similarly to what we saw with the 1-1-2-2 trade setup. We just have more premium collected to start with, taking a bit longer to fully evaporate and have the premium turn to a credit for closing. The concept is the same.

Summarizing the differences between the 1-1-2-2 trade and 1-1-2 trade, the 1-1-2 trade collects about 20% more premium in exchange for more loss if the market drops more than 37.5% in the 55 days of the trade. How likely is it for the market to drop more than 37.5%? Is buying the long puts for protection worth it? That’s up to each trader to decide.

Buying power requirements

I usually don’t spend much time talking about buying power because most trades I do are defined risk credit trades where the amount collected is a significant portion of the capital at risk. This trade is not so much, whether defined risk (1-1-2-2) or a naked ratio spread (1-1-2). In non-margin accounts, we collect 0.7% or 0.2% respectively, which isn’t much.

Below is an analysis of different possible ways to trade. I looked at trading each of these strategies three different ways. First, I looked at a cash secured account, like a retirement account. Next, I looked at an account with margin for naked options. Finally, I looked at a much different approach, trading futures options with span margin. The margin and span margin amounts came from entering this trade into the tastyworks trading platform.

Buying power differences for Margin and Futures
Comparing buying power impact of different account types for the two strategies

I highlighted some key takeaway points. First, is how leveraged span margin with futures options can be for this trade. Our most capital efficient trade would be doing the 1-1-2-2 on futures span margin where we would collect 100 times the premium as a percentage of buying power (20%) than the non-margin account of the 1-1-2 trade (0.2%). Of course, with leverage comes much more risk. I chose to consider a loss of 10 times the initial credit as a practical worst-case scenario. The span margin would end up costing huge amounts more in a disaster and could potentially wipe out an account if the trade used a high percentage of the account’s capital.

A couple of weird margin anomalies to point out. In my margin account, the defined risk 1-1-2-2 trade required almost twice the buying power as the undefined 1-1-2, which is weird because clearly there is more risk in the naked 1-1-2. I think it may be that the calculation for defined risk is normally much less than undefined and the software may just assume that margin is not useful in defined risk. On the other hand, defining the risk on the futures version cut the buying power by 1/3. Different brokers may calculate their margin requirements differently, so don’t take this as universal truth. Similarly, remember that while defining risk usually increases the return on capital, it makes outsize losses more likely, especially when scaling up. Notice that the highly leveraged futures 1-1-2-2 would lose twice as much as a percentage of capital that the futures 1-1-2 setup in a 10x loss. I discussed this phenomenon in detail in my post on comparing risk.

Remember that margin and span margin change as the trade progresses depending on the market behavior. Span margin is subject to big swings when prices go against a position. A broker may force a position to close much earlier than a trader would want to get out due to expanding capital requirements. So, while initially the position is cheap to enter, a trader needs to limit each position to a fraction of the overall account size.

But the good side of this is that this trade can be entered for a very small cost. The trade is very high probability. We can also make more than the premium collected. I didn’t include it in the chart, but maximum profit for the most leveraged choice above would be $5,805 profit on $4,000 buying power, a return on capital of 145%. And there is over a 20% probability of that happening.

One final note on the buying power analysis table. To keep the quantities an apples-to-apples comparison, I used double the number of /ES futures options because futures options only control half as much value as SPX index options. So, technically, those futures options trades listed are 2-2-4-4 and 2-2-4 because they use twice the number of contracts to get the same notional exposure. I reviewed differences between index options and futures options in detail in my post about different ways to trade options on the S&P 500 index.

What about small accounts?

Readers looking at this may be thinking, “Gee, this is great for multi-millionaires, but what if the account is too small to consider any of these buying powers?” Great question- there are other alternatives. First off, a trader could use half the buying power listed by just trading options on one contract of the Mini S&P 500 futures (/ES). The 1-1-2-2 example would only take $2,000 buying power for $402 premium received. But, if that is still too much, we can make it a lot less.

Many traders are more familiar with options on the SPY exchange traded fund, which trades at approximately 1/10 the value of the S&P 500 index. For futures options, there is also options on the Micro S&P 500 futures contract (/MES), equal to 1/10 of the /ES contract size, or 1/20 of the size of an SPX option. By using SPY or /MES, we cut the size of the trade down by 1/10 compared to the above table. If the account is taxable, another choice would be the $XSP index, a 1/10 value index of the S&P 500 with favorable tax treatment, but lower liquidity. Again, all these alternative versions of S&P 500 options are discussed in my post on different S&P 500 choices.

So, for an account with futures trading capability, this trade could use /MES futures options and get into the 1-1-2-2 trade for just $200 buying power. An account with options margin could use SPY or $XSP and get into the 1-1-2 trade for $6,800 buying power. A trader doesn’t need a million dollar amount to trade this.

Concluding thoughts

I know a number of people who have traded versions of this trade during the bear market of 2022 without any issues. In fact, it could be argued that this trade, like most trades that collect credits from selling puts, works best if entering when the market is already down and implied volatility is high. Bad scenarios are already priced into option premium and there is a lot of cushion between strikes. This trade is most dangerous when volatility is low and prices are high- the probabilities are not as good, because a move of more than two times the expected move down is not nearly as far.

While not for everyone, the 1-1-2-2 and 1-1-2 trades provide a very high probability of success with a nice payout when used with leverage. The trade requires monitoring to maximize profit and to prevent catastrophic loss, so it really is not a set it and forget it trade. The key is to have a plan to manage the position if the market goes against the trade and stick to the plan.

Options on the S&P 500 Index

the S&P 500 index is very appealing but most traders don’t know there are at least 7 different great choices for options tied to the index

For many new options traders, trading the S&P 500 index is very appealing for a number of reasons. But most new traders are not aware that there are at least 7 different great choices for options tied to the index. Most have multiple expirations each week and are very liquid. Each choice has unique differences from the others that may make it appealing in certain circumstances. For a long time I was only aware of one way, and when I now tell others about these additional choices for options, it’s usually a pleasant surprise.

Background

The S&P 500 index is the most quoted benchmark of the stock market for good reason. It is made up of the 500 largest US publicly traded companies. The index is weighted by market capitalization of each firm, so the largest companies have more impact on the index than smaller ones. In fact, as of this writing, the seven largest firms are responsible for 30% of weight of the index. While the news media often leads market reports by sharing the Dow Jones Industrial Average, most traders and asset managers pay little to no attention to the Dow because it only includes 30 stocks and has a bizarre price weighted averaging system that gives the most weight to companies with the highest price per share.

If a trader can choose only one investment to own, some form of the S&P 500 index would be the most logical choice. When selling options, unexpected moves outside of expectations can lead to large losses. Many studies have shown that the S&P 500 index is much less likely to have an outsized move than individual stocks or even other indexes. TastyTrade has done numerous studies on this that are free to review. So options on the S&P 500 index can be a large part of a trader’s strategy. Understanding the variety of choices for trading options on the S&P 500 can be very helpful for traders of all experience levels.

Mutual Funds?

Almost every employee retirement account offers a mutual fund that mimics the S&P 500 index. While mutual funds are great for retirement accounts that rarely change holdings, they aren’t that useful for trading in general, and specifically not for options. There are literally dozens of mutual funds based on the S&P 500, but they share the same trading issues- they only trade at the closing price of the day which isn’t known until after a trade is submitted, and there aren’t options on any of them. Active traders want to be able to buy and sell at any point in the trading day and have options for hedging or amplifying returns, so mutual funds just won’t cut it.

Exchange Traded Funds

In recent years, exchange traded funds (ETFs) have grown in popularity. These funds are structured to match the holdings of underlying indexes or other trading strategies. The funds actually hold shares in the index that they are matching performance with. By far the largest ETF is the SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust, which goes by ticker symbol SPY, and follows the S&P 500 index. It is priced at approximately 1/10 the price of the index per share. So, if the S&P 500 index is priced at 4500, the SPY ETF will be priced around 450. The SPY price isn’t exactly 1/10 of the S&P 500 index price, but slightly less by varying amounts. The variations are due to fees that come out of the ETF, and the impact of dividend payouts. SPY pays dividends once a quarter, and the price of SPY gets closer to 1/10 of the S&P 500 index as the dividend payment approaches and then drops after the dividend is allocated. Generally, the variation is less than one dollar in SPY, so if the S&P 500 index is trading 4500, SPY is likely to actually trade at somewhere between 449 and 449.50. For most traders, this difference isn’t a big deal, but just a minor factor to be aware of when comparing SPY to the S&P 500 index. Because of its name and ticker, SPY is often referred to as the “Spiders.”

SPY option contracts are based on 100 shares of SPY. If an option is exercised or assigned, the option seller will either be forced to buy or sell 100 shares of the SPY ETF. Because SPY pays a quarterly dividend, traders who sell calls on SPY need to be aware of the risk of having the call option exercised on dividend day. If a trader has a call near expiration that is at the money or in the money, it will likely be exercised because the dividend can be captured by the owner of the stock. If the call seller doesn’t have shares to be called away, and the option is executed, not only will the seller be short shares of SPY, but the seller will have to pay the dividend to the broker that they are borrowing the shares from. Only call sellers have to worry about this, but it is a real consideration four times a year.

Both SPY and options on SPY are extremely liquid with bid-ask spreads normally at one penny. I’ve found option trades that include four legs, can usually be filled immediately for two cents away from the mid price of the combined bid-ask spreads of all the legs. Options are priced in increments of one cent, so pricing can be fairly precise. SPY options have 3 expirations per week, with contracts for every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday. Adjustments are made for holidays when markets are closed. Every expiration has dozens of strikes, going several expected moves above and below the current price of SPY.

While SPY isn’t the only ETF to track the S&P 500 index, it is the predominant one, and really the only ETF to really consider for trying to match the performance of the actual index. There are a couple of other ETFs to consider that are designed to magnify or reverse the performance of the S&P 500 index. For some strategies, these might be helpful.

UPRO is an ETF from ProShares that is leveraged to deliver 3x the performance of the S&P 500 index. Officially, it is called the ProShares UltraPro S&P 500 ETF. So, if the S&P 500 index goes up 1% in a day, UPRO will go up 3%. However, the reverse is also true- if the S&P 500 index goes down 1% in a day, UPRO will go down 3%. To keep this relationship working, the holding in the ETF are adjusted each night, so over time the ETF won’t exactly keep pace at 3x the performance. The ETF relationship is more precise day by day than longer term, but will be relatively close to 3x. UPRO has options expiring every Friday and is somewhat liquid with wider bid-ask spreads than SPY. Because of large swings in price, the ETF has occasional splits to keep the share price reasonable, and the daily adjustment of holdings can alter the precision of the leverage factor, so the share price isn’t consistently convertible to a multiple of the S&P 500 index.

The opposite effect is achieved from the SDS, or Proshares Ultrashort S&P 500 ETF. SDS is set up to delivery -2x the performance of the S&P 500 index. So, if SPY goes up 1%, SDS goes down 2%. Over time the price of SDS tends to get lower and lower, and a reverse split is needed to get the price up to a reasonable level. Options on SDS also expire weekly. Both SDS and UPRO options are based on 100 shares of the corresponding ETF.

Options on leveraged ETFs are much more volatile than on non-leveraged ETFs. Because traders of these options know that there is multiple times price movement, options are priced accordingly. Because of this, strategies with options can perform very differently than with options based on the non-overaged SPY. The switch from SPY options to UPRO or SDS options is not as simple as it might appear, so research thoroughly before jumping in to these unique options.

There are other ETFs that follow the S&P 500 index as well as others that leverage the S&P 500, but they don’t trade with as much volume, and their options trade less frequently. Why trade a product that is less liquid, with fewer options, and much lower option volume when a better choice is available? I see no reason to use anything but SPY, UPRO, and SDS.

There are also ETFs that represent sectors or portions of the S&P 5oo, or weight the 500 stocks of the index equally. So, for value vs. growth, or Finance stocks or Utilities, there’s are ETFs with options of every flavor. But none of those represent trading the full S&P 500 index, so we won’t dig in any further into those products, because the point of this discussion is ways to trade the benchmark index.

For most traders, SPY options are the only options on the S&P 500 index they use, and many traders aren’t aware of any other choices for trading options on the index. But, we’ve only just begun.

Index Options

Why trade options on an ETF based on an index when you can simply trade options on the actual index? Index options remove the ETF from the mix and link options directly to the index. For the S&P 500, there are two index options available, SPX and XSP. SPX is literally the S&P 500 Index, and XSP is the Mini S&P 500 Index.

Traders are often not aware of these ticker symbols or the fact that options are available for these two indexes. There are a couple of reasons for this. There is no way to actually buy or sell the actual S&P 500 index directly, a trader can’t buy or sell shares of SPX. Additionally, since SPX is an index and not a stock or ETF, many brokerages don’t show it as SPX. For example, Schwab lists it as $SPX. Other sites may show it as ^SPX or .SPX. The point is that you have to know what you are looking for to even find it. Since SPX is literally the S&P 500 Index, it is priced at the full price of the index. So, if the S&P 500 Index is at 4500, SPX is at 4500. They are exactly the same.

Okay, SPX is the S&P 500 index. But, what is the Mini S&P 500 index, you may ask? XSP, or the Mini S&P 500 is simply an index that is 1/10 of the S&P 500. However, unlike SPY, which is approximately 1/10 of the S&P 500 index, XSP is exactly 1/10 of the S&P 500 index. Why do we need an index that is 1/10 of another index? It’s all because of options and sizing of positions.

Options on SPX don’t represent 100 shares in SPX because SPX doesn’t have shares. Instead, SPX options represent a value of 100 times the value of SPX. Think of it as if SPX had shares and the options represented 100 shares, even though there aren’t any shares. XSP options represent 100 times the value of the XSP. So, in both cases we still have a multiplier of 100 as we do with ETF options. This is where the similarity in options end.

One difference is that dividends are not part of the S&P 500 index. Many of the 500 stocks in the index pay dividends at various times throughout each quarter, and those payments have an impact on the individual stock price, which will then impact the price of the index. But the index has no mechanism to pay dividends because it is just an average of the prices of the 500 stocks it tracks and isn’t tradable itself. So, option buyers and sellers of SPX and XSP don’t have to consider dividends as an event, like traders in the SPY ETF.

Since index options can’t be settled in shares, they settle in cash when they expire. In many ways, this can be a lot easier. If an option expires $5 in the money, a call buyer will receive $500 from the account of the call seller at expiration because of the 100 multiplier. If an option expires out of the money, it is worthless and there is nothing to settle.

Cash settlement can be a bit confusing at first, so just realize that there is nothing to actually buy or sell from assignment- a put seller that is assigned doesn’t have to buy 100 shares, they just have to pay the difference in the current price at expiration from the strike price of the option. If the trader sold a put on a stock or ETF, they would be assigned shares that they would buy for more than the current price, which they could turn around and sell at a loss. Index options eliminate the step of buying and selling shares, and just settles the difference in price with cash.

Index options use European style option assignment, while stock and ETF options use American style options. American style options can be executed at any time by the option buyer, and this becomes a consideration for option sellers that have positions in the money before expiration. However, European style options can only be executed at expiration. So, sellers of index options don’t have to worry about having an early assignment before expiration, and buyers don’t have that option. And since index options are cash settled, there really isn’t an “option” at all. In the money index options are simply “settled” at expiration.

SPX options have lots of different expirations. Originally, these options only had expirations once a month on the third Friday of the month. Later, month end and quarter end expirations were added. Then weekly expirations every Friday were added. And now there are Monday and Wednesday expirations. Soon, maybe by the time you read this, there will be options expiring every trading weekday when Tuesday and Thursday are added.

One holdover from the original monthly expiration is that monthly index option expirations are different than all the other expirations in a couple of ways. First, and most importantly, monthly index options expire in the morning (AM) of expiration, while all other expirations expire at the close (PM) of trading. For SPX, there are actually two option expirations on the third Friday of the month, the monthly AM expiration, and the Friday PM weekly expiration. The settlement price for AM expirations of SPX is based on the opening trade price of each of the 500 stocks of the S&P 500 index. After each of the 500 stocks has traded on expiration morning, the prices are calculated to determine a settlement price for expiration. However, trading on the expiring option is stopped at the close of trading the day before. So, SPX option sellers and buyers are stuck with their positions from Thursday afternoon until Friday morning not knowing what the index price will be for settlement until the market actually opens and sets the price. For PM expirations, it is simpler, when the market closes, option trading stops and expiration settlement is based on the price of each of the 500 stocks in their last trade of the day. If you watch the price at the closing bell, you will see it change slightly by several cents after the close as all the different orders that execute at the market close get accounted for. The second way that AM and PM expirations vary with index options is that when the option contract is listed, monthly contracts use the ticker symbol SPX, while all other expirations use SPXW. The W is for weekly, even though the expirations may be quarterly, monthly, Monday, or Wednesday, and soon Tuesday or Thursday. So for S&P 500 Index options, just know that SPX listed options expire in the morning (AM) and SPXW listed options expire in the afternoon (PM). Either way, when you are searching for option listings, most brokers list SPX and SPXW options together under SPX.

XSP options are a more recent creation, and only have PM expirations. There aren’t different naming conventions either. Settlement works the same, with prices set by the final trade of each of the 500 stocks of the index when the market closes.

Another difference between SPX and SPY options is that SPX options are traded in increments of 5 cents. Since SPX is 10 times the price of SPY or XSP, trading increments or tick size is actually more precise on a percentage basis for SPX. XSP trades in increments of one cent like SPY. SPX options are also very liquid and orders can usually be filled 5 cents away from the mid price, even in multi-leg orders. There is a little difference based on trade volume of different expirations. Monthly expirations typically have the most volume, followed by Friday PM expirations and month-end expirations. Monday and Wednesday expirations have the least volume and can sometimes be slightly harder to fill, especially for strikes away from the money with more than a week until expiration.

XSP have a lot less volume than SPX or even SPY options, so they can be a little less liquid. Because of their pricing, they trade very similar to SPY, but with a little less liquidity. Since XSP is an index option, there is no worry of assignment, and dividends are not a consideration.

Some brokers don’t allow trading of index options in their accounts, and some strategies are not allowed with index options in certain types of accounts. Some brokers charge higher commissions and fees for index options than for stock and ETF options, so watch out!

Finally, index options get a different tax treatment and have a different accounting treatment at the end of the calendar year. Index options fall under Section 1256 of the tax code which allows a trader to classify 60% of the gains from trading index options as long term, while only 40% are short term. For taxable accounts of traders in mid to high tax brackets, this can be a significant advantage! It doesn’t matter if the option was held for a minute or six months, the 60/40 tax assignment applies. The other part of 1256 treatment is that index option positions are “marked to market” at the end of the year, meaning that a trader considers the option to be a profit or a loss at the end of the year even if the position is still open based on the price at the end of the year of open positions. In stocks and stock options, only positions that have been closed are evaluated for a profit or loss. Using mark to market can be a bit confusing the first time around, but most brokers do all the calculations and provide them in a year end tax statement.

The CBOE has announced another index option on the S&P 500 index to start trading very soon, call Nano options. This index will be 1/1000 of the SPX, or 1/100 of XSP, to allow very small option trades on the S&P 500. Supposedly the ticker symbol will be NANOS. Stay tuned for more details.

Futures Options

There are two futures contracts on the S&P 500 index that offer options. The primary one is called the E-Mini S&P 500 Futures, which uses the symbol /ES at most brokers. In listings of futures contracts and futures options the symbol will be followed by a letter to designate the month the future expires and a number for the year of expiration- for example /ESH2 represents the future contract expiring in April of 2022. The other futures contract is called Micro E-Mini S&P 500 Futures, and uses the symbol /MES. Some brokers may use other characters to designate futures instead of the forward slash, and some may require approval of futures to even see the ticker symbols. Consult with each broker for details.

Futures are tradable contracts based on the price of the underlying index at the expiration of the contract. Futures contracts in general expire at a variety of times in the month with /ES and /MES expiring on Wednesday mornings and settling to opening prices of the S&P 500 index. Since the futures contract is based on what the market expects the price to be at expiration, the price of the future is usually a little less or sometimes a little more than the current value of the S&P 500 index. However, it generally doesn’t vary that much because the current price is one of the best indicators of what the future price might be and futures buyers and sellers won’t let the prices to diverge that much because it presents an opportunity for arbitrage between the different values, knowing that at expiration they will converge. At any given time, there are many different contract expirations available to trade, going months out in time. The contract month closest to expiration is called the front month. Buying a front month futures contract is as close to directly owning the S&P 500 index as you can get. The value of the futures contract goes up and down with the index.

A single /ES contract is valued at 50 times the S&P 500 index. One might think of it as owning 50 shares of the S&P 500 index if the index price were the price of a share. A single /MES contract is valued at 5 times the S&P 500 index. These values are known as the notional value. However, futures contracts are priced at prices similar to the actual S&P 500 index, regardless of the notional multiplier.

Let’s take an example. Let’s say that the S&P 500 index is currently at 5010, and front month futures contracts for both /ES and /MES are trading at 5000 as they are slightly less. The /ES contract would have a notional value of $250,000, and the /MES would have a notional value of $25,000. If the market went up 100 points on the S&P 500, and both /ES and /MES went up to 5100, the owner of one contract of /ES would make $5000, and the owner of /MES would make $500. For most people $250,000 for one contract is too expensive, but futures contract owners aren’t required to have the full amount in their account, but just a fraction due to the assumption that the price will only move within a small percentage of the index price. If the price moves more than expected against a contract owner or seller, additional capital will be required. This practice is called span margining, and can be very helpful to allow traders to leverage a position, but also very dangerous if over-used and the market moves against a position. For example, if a trader buys an /ES contract priced at 5000 and has $50,000 in their account, a 20% decline in the market to 4000 would wipe out the account. While /MES is one tenth the size, the problem can be the same for a trader with a smaller account.

So far we’ve talked just about the futures contracts themselves. The topic of this post is trading options on the S&P 500 index, not trading futures on the S&P 500 index. So, let’s talk about how options on futures work. In particular let’s look at options on /ES and /MES. One key difference from other options we’ve looked at is that /ES and /MES options don’t use a 100 multiplier, like stocks or index options. Instead, futures options are an option to buy or sell one single futures contract. Which futures contract is the option associated with? Typically, it is the futures contract that is next to expire after the option expires. So, an option on /MES expiring on the first Friday in March is tied to the March futures contract, which will still have time remaining when the option expires.

So, buying an /ES call gives the buyer the option to buy one /ES futures contract at option expiration, and buying a /MES put gives the buyer the option to sell one /MES futures contract at option expiration. So, settlement of the option at expiration doesn’t settle in stock or in cash, but in a futures contract. The price paid for the futures contract is the strike price of the option. For example, if a trader buys a call option for /ES with a strike price of 5000, they would get to buy an /ES futures contract at options expiration for $5000, multiplied times the /ES futures multiplier of 50, or a total of $250,000, assuming that /ES is trading above 5000, making the option in the money. On the other hand if the price of /ES is below the strike price of the call option, the option would expire worthless. Similarly, if a /MES 5000 put expired in the money, the settlement would be to sell a /MES futures contract for $5000 multiplied times the futures multiplier of 5, for a total of $25,000.

There are futures options for /ES and /MES that expire every Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, so there are plenty of expirations to choose from. And futures and futures options trade virtually around the clock, from Sunday afternoon until Friday afternoon. In fact, the price of /ES in the overnight hours moves around quite a bit based on news and as the opening of the market approaches, it is a fairly accurate indicator of where the market will open. Meanwhile the S&P 500 index stays the same during the overnight, because it is based on a calculation from the trading of the 500 stocks in the index, which don’t broadly trade at night.

The span margining ability to trade using the buying power associated only with a calculated expected move applies to futures options as well as futures contracts. As a result, traders can put on highly leveraged trades without consuming a lot of buying power. With this capability comes significant risk. Traders have to be very aware at all times of the true total risk that comes with trades in futures options. With futures options, the buying power used is not a good indicator of the capital at risk in the case of a very large move of the market up or down. Some brokers allow selling of naked futures options for very little buying power, where selling the same notional value of SPX or SPY could easily require ten times more capital even though the true risk is the same. Many trading strategies with futures options may seem very safe because they are high probability trades- perhaps they win 90% of the time- the problem is when the losing 10% happens and the trader is not prepared for the damage that occurs to the account. Risk management is critical in all options trades, but particularly in futures options using span margin. Stops and hedges become the difference between staying solvent and going broke.

Like index options, futures and futures options also use section 1256 tax treatment with 60% long term gains and 40% short term gains, and are marked to market at the end of the year. There are no dividend risk issues.

One final unique advantage to futures options is that they are exempt from the Pattern Day Trade rule. For accounts under $25,000 where trades are opened and closed the same day, a trader can have severe limitations placed on an account. Generally, the limit is five day trades in a rolling seven day week. This can be stocks or options. Futures and futures options are governed by different regulations, so many day traders favor futures.

Many brokers have significant approval processes to be allowed to trade futures or futures options. Some limit them only to standard taxable margin accounts. Other brokers don’t allow them at all. Go to the office of your broker and see if anyone there has any experience trading futures or futures options- it is likely no one there has a clue and they will tell you not to do it. If you have friends that trade in the market, chances are that almost none have ever traded a future or futures option, so you are likely on your own. Your best source for help will be specialist from your broker’s headquarters, specialized training materials, or online resources from your trading community as I discussed in an earlier post.

If trading futures options is so complex, hard to understand, and risky, why do it? For many strategies, futures options can fill in gaps at a low capital requirement. Some hedging strategies can be too expensive with stock or index options, but more affordable with index options. Because of the unique multipliers, futures options for the S&P 500 index may be just the right size for a particular need. And finally, because the futures prices move and trade all night, futures and futures options allow trading on that information at some brokers.

Review of choices

After a lot of discussion and explanation, we have come up with seven choices for trading options on the S&P 500 index. Five of these are directly correlated to the index, and two are leveraged. Remember that the UPRO ETF moves up and down with the S&P 500 index, but three times as much each day. SDS, the UltraShort ETF not only moves the opposite direction of the S&P 500 index, but twice as much in the opposite direction on a percentage basis each day. Because of this leverage, the options on these two ETFs behave in unique ways which can be helpful for some strategies. However, most traders are more likely to want options that are based on underlying entities that move on a 1:1 basis with the S&P 500 index. So let’s review those choices.

TickerTypeIndex vs
Strikes
# of Shares
or Multiplier
Notional
Value @
SPX = 4000
Settle
as
Tax
Treatment
SPXindex1 : 1100$400,000cash60/40
/ESfutures1 : 150$200,000one contract60/40
SPYETF1/10100$40,000100 sharesshort term
XSPindex1/10100$40,000cash60/40
/MESfutures1 : 15$20,000one contract60/40
This table lists key differences in the five main choices for options on the S&P 500 index, listed in order of notional size. In this table notional value refers to the amount of capital controlled by a single option with a strike tied to the S&P 500 index being at 4000 (SPY and XSP would have strikes at 400, while SPX, /ES, and /MES would have strikes at 4000).


While SPY is the simplest choice because it is most readily available, there are reasons to consider each of the other listed choices to best meet the needs of a specific account or strategy. From biggest to smallest, SPX controls 20 times as much capital as /MES, and the other choices provide increments in between. I was personally reluctant to trade futures options at first, but for no good reason other than I wasn’t familiar with their nuance. As I write this, I currently have at least one contract of each of these five choices open amongst the various accounts I manage.

For all of our choices, we currently have the ability to select expirations three days a week, and potentially five days a week in the near future. Each choice has an extensive selection of strikes available at each expiration, although one can expect Friday expirations and month end expirations to have more choices and more trading volume than Mondays and Wednesdays. We expect third Friday (monthly expirations) to have more choices and trading volume than any other expiration in the month.

My personal preference in most situations is SPX due to its large size. Even though commissions and fees are more on a per contract basis, the fact that SPX is 10 times bigger than SPY or XSP makes commissions and fees almost negligible in most trades of SPX, where they can be a substantial consideration with SPY and XSP in some strategies that deliver narrow profits. For futures, I like /ES over /MES for the same reasons. However, when I’m trying out a new strategy or working with a small account, I often have no choice but to use SPY, XSP, or /MES. For most new traders, SPY is the first and easiest choice, but eventually there may be a need to use another choice. For example, if you start trading 10 option contracts at a time, it might make sense to use SPX. If SPY is too big, you may want to get approval to trade futures and trade options on /MES. If you have a taxable account and are in a higher tax bracket, XSP may be a good alternative to SPY to reduce short term capital gains. So, learn the differences and make the choice that makes the most sense for the situation.

If you want to investigate strategies for trading options on the S&P 500 index, take a look at some of my favorite strategies. You may also want to read my page on how different option strategies have very different risk profiles.

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